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RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION
IN PUBLIC DEBATE

Matthew S. Steffey *
Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical Christian church, sought permission to use local
public school facilities during non-school hours to show a six-part film series depicting "the undermining influences of the media that [can] only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an early
stage. 1 Center Moriches Union Free School District denied the request based on a
school district rule which stated that "school premises shall not be used by any
group for religious purposes." 2 At oral argument, the school district conceded that
access would not be foreclosed to others who sought to present views on family
problems.' This provided the focal point for the Supreme Court's unanimous conclusion that to deny Lamb's Chapel access in these circumstances violated a basic
free speech guarantee: Government may not discriminate on the basis of a speaker's viewpoint in deciding whether to grant a speaker access to government property.

4

Under the free speech clause of the First Amendment, a school district's decision to deny a particular speaker after-hours access to school property is evaluated
by reference to the district's general policy or practice concerning access to school
property for communicative purposes. Speaking broadly, that policy can be
placed along a line running from a policy of no access, through various policies
that grant access to selected speakers and uses, to a policy of indiscriminate access.
At either end of this spectrum, current law renders the constitutional questions
rather straightforward. On one hand, "[t]here is no question that [a school district], like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is dedicated. . . [and thus blanketly refuse to]
permit[] after-hours use of its property . ... "'
At the other extreme, a school district may choose to designate its property as a
forum open for all communicative purposes and thereby subject itself to the constitutional standards that govern "traditional public fora" such as public sidewalks,
streets, and parks. 8 Those standards, among the most stringent in constitutional

*Associate Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law.
1. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2144 (1993).
2. Id.
3. See 'Censorship'ofReligiousSpeech, 61 U.S.L.W. 3609, 3611 (March 9, 1993).
4. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
5. Id. at 2146 (citations omitted).
6. Id. The Court has suggested that government may be deemed to have opened its property for all communicative purposes if it is sufficiently indiscriminate about groups granted access. See id.
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law, require "subject-matter or speaker exclusion. . . to be justified by a compelling state interest and to be narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 7
Analytical nuance only arises when a school district decides to open its property for some, but not all, communicative activity. For those who fall within the
categories of speakers or uses granted access, a denial of access must satisfy the
test of strict scrutiny applicable to denials of access to traditional public fora.' Regarding such speakers and uses, the forum is public, albeit for a limited universe of
speakers and uses.
Regarding speakers and uses that fall outside the categories granted access,
however, the forum remains "nonpublic." Denials of access need only meet the
softer and more elastic standards of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.'
Specifically,
[w]ith respect to public property that is not a [traditional or] designated public forum open for indiscriminate public use for communicative purposes .... "[c]ontrol
over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity
so long as the distinctions are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum
and are viewpoint neutral." 10
In Lamb's Chapel, the constitutional defect in the exclusion of the religious film
series was that it forbade presentation of a religious view on a subject otherwise
designated for access. 11 In the Court's words,
"[while] a speaker may be excluded from a non-public forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum ... or if he is not a
member of the class of speakers for whose special benefit the forum was created...
the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker
solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject."
The film involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible under
denied solely because the film
[the school district's policy], and its exhibition was
12
dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint.
Two things about the Lamb's Chapel decision are most noteworthy. The first is
that the Court considered the free speech issue uncontroversial. Not a whisper of
dissent was raised against the conclusion that, in these circumstances, religious
views regarding an issue have the same constitutional stature as non-religious
views. This is not to say, though, that the Court's resolution of the free speech

7. Id.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 2147. While now apparently settled, the development of constitutional standards applicable to policies of selective access to government property (other than traditional public fora) proved both confusing and the
subject of much contention. Cf International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992); U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
10. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,2147 (1993) (citations omitted) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806).
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question is of no moment. Many religious groups espouse a religious view on
every subject, and Lamb's Chapel holds that government may not exclude from
public debate those who wish to present a religious perspective. The importance of
this conclusion can be seen by comparing it to an alternative rejected by the Court.
The Court was asked to conclude, but did not, that the school board permissibly
excluded a subject - religion - from the forum, but did not exhibit viewpoint bias
by favoring one religious perspective over another."3
The second point that bears mention is that the decision leaves many Free
Speech and Establishment Clause questions unanswered. The decision does not
say whether a school district can open its property for religious purposes but exclude other groups. It does not say whether a school district can, conversely, open
its property for a small range of outside groups and activities - say athletic events,
charity fundraising, and political elections -but exclude religious worship.14 In
fact, it does not even say whether a school district can open its property for such a
limited set of groups and activities and include religious worship."5 Each of these
situations presents an Establishment Clause challenge more serious than the one
raised in Lamb's Chapel." Moreover, each requires a determination under the
Free Speech Clause of the reasonableness of the school board's policy, an issue not
reached in Lamb's Chapel and one which the Supreme Court has usually resolved
in government's favor.17
These two points provide the focus for the two papers that follow, the first written by counsel for Lamb's Chapel, the other by counsel for Center Moriches Union

13. See id.
14. For such a school district policy to be unconstitutional, the Court arguably must relax the present constraints of the Establishment Clause while simultaneously tightening the constraints of the Free Speech Clause.
Thus, a justice inclined to allow government more discretion generally, including more latitude under the
Establishment Clause to confer benefits on religious groups, would not necessarily strike down a government
decision not to confer such benefits. Cf Michael W McConnell, Religious Freedomat a Crossroads,59 U. CHI.
L. REv. 115, 116 (1992) ("Initial decisions suggest that the Rehnquist Court may replace the reflexive secularism
of the Warren and Burger Courts with an equally inappropriate statism. Just when the Court appears to be shedding its inordinate distrust of religion, it appears to be embracing an inordinate faith in government.").
15. See Lambs Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
The showing of this film would not have been during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the
school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church members. [School] District property
had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organizations. Under these circumstances, as in
Widmar [v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)], there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental. As in Widmar, permitting District
property to be used to exhibit the film involved in this case would not have been an establishment of religion under the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). Widmar involved a student religious group that sought access to a fbrum otherwise completely open to student groups. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72.
16. It is interesting to note that even the majority's summary discussion of an essentially settled Establishment
Clause question drew two pointed responses. CompareLambs Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 (White, J., majority),
with id. at 2149 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
17. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (exclusion
upheld); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (same). See also International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) (ban on solicitation upheld); U.S. v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (same). But see Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, 482
U.S. 569 (1987) (complete ban on First Amendment activities in the Los Angeles International Airport struck
down because no conceivable government interest could justify such an absolute prohibition on speech).
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Free School District. Predictably, the first essay seeks to cast the decision as a pronouncement with broad implications for the constitutional protection of religious
speech and activity, while the second would paint the case as one of little or no
consequence. Counsel for Lamb's Chapel argues that the Free Speech,
Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses require a broad rule of access for religious speech and speakers; counsel for the school district, in contrast, finds it
hard to understand why the Court chose to hear the case at all. Such a divergence of
views is bound to warrant more reflection than might initially be suggested by an
opinion on a free speech issue that commanded unanimous assent from the Court
and which spans a scant two pages in the official reports.18

18. Lamb Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147-49 (free speech discussion comprises two of the majority's five-page
opinion).

